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FORESEEABILITY IN
CONTRACT AND TORT: THE
PROBLEMS OF
RESPONSIBILITY AND
REMOTENESS
Banks McDowell*
The concept offorseeability is used in rules and legal analysis as if its meaning is
clearand nonproblemati. Many lawyers, teachersandjudges, however, do not share
this comforting conclusion. This Article presents a theoreticalanalysis of what foreseeabilityought to mean and its implicationsfor civil law. The authorproposes that
foreseeability actuallyfunctions similarly in contract and tort, even though the conventional doctrine of those disciplinespoints to the contrary. Foreseeabilityserves two
purposes:first, in traditionalfault-based theory, foreseeability implies some form of
sanction,helping civil law fulfill its normative role; second, in areas where the search
for fault has been abandoned,foreseeability serves the narrowerfunction of identifying which party ought to be responsiblefor arrangingcompensation for harm.

INTRODUCTION

Anglo-American law is that
one major difference between contract and tort is the degree to
which foreseeability limits the amount of damages which the plaintiff may recover.1 In tort, the defendant is said to be liable for all

A COMMONPLACE observation in

* Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law; B.A., LL.B., University of
Tulsa; LL.M., S.J.D., University of Michigan. The author would like to thank Paul A. Wallace and Joel Levin who read an earlier draft and made many helpful suggestions.
1. See, e.g., W. P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 92, at 665 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON]:
Generally speaking, the tort remedy is likely to be more advantageous to the injured
party in the greater number of cases, if only because it will so often permit the
recovery of greater damages. Under the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, the damages
recoverable for breach of contract are limited to those within the contemplation of
the defendant at the time the contract was made, and in some jurisdictions, at least,
to those for which the defendant has tacitly agreed to assume responsibility.
(citations omitted); E. A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 874-75 (1982):
By introducing this requirement of "contemplation" for the recovery of consequential damages, the court imposed an important new limitation on the scope of recovery that juries could allow for breach of contract. The result was to impose a more
severe limitation on the recovery of damages for breach of contract than that applicable to actions in tort or for breach of warranty, in which substantial or proximate
cause is the test.
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injuries proximately caused by his act.2 In contract, the plaintiff
may recover only such damages as the promisor, at the time of contracting, could reasonably have foreseen would result from a breach
of his contractual obligation.3
This distinction has been thought so significant that plaintiffs'
lawyers, when not constrained by a statute of limitations or difficulties in proving negligence, strive to persuade courts that borderline
cases should be classified as tort in order to avoid the contract limi(citations omitted). This distinction is reflected in the Restatements of Law. Compare RE(SEcOND) OF CoNTRAcTS § 351 (1981) (damages not recoverable where breaching party did not foresee them as reasonable result of breach at time contract made) with
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 (1965) (fact that actor's conduct was substantial
factor in other's injury is sufficient for liability, regardless of whether harm foreseen or foreseeable by actor). A ritual recitation of the distinction often appears in cases. E.g., Bay Gen.
Indus., Inc. v. Johnson, 418 A.2d 1050, 1056 (D.C. Ct. App. 1980) ("[Tlortious need only be
within the risk created by the action, whereas contract damages must be foreseeable.").
2. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, §§ 41-45. Some authorities have imposed
liability even if the damages could not be foreseen by the defendant. An extreme example of
this position is the well-known case of Vosburg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403 (1891).
An 11-year-old school boy kicked a 14-year-old classmate on the shin. Due to a pre-existing
medical condition, this kick caused serious, yet unforeseeable, injury. The court held the
defendant responsible in full, since "the wrongdoer is liable for all injuries resulting directly
from the wrongful act, whether they could or could not have been foreseen by him." Id. at
530, 50 N.W. at 404. See also Dellwo v. Pearson, 256 Minn. 452, 107 N.W.2d 859 (1961)
(liability found where propellor of boat operated by 12-year-old boy caught plaintiff's fishing
line and caused fishing rod to injure plaintiff, foresecability not the test of proximate cause).
3. This principle was first established in Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145
(1854):
Where two parties have made a contract which one of them had broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract
should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally,
i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or
such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both
parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.
Id. at 151. This formulation of the rule continues in force in many American jurisdictions.
See, ag., LE.T. Corp. v. Frank Paxton Co., 329 N.W.2d 416 (Iowa 1983) (building company
not liable for diminution in value of property caused by its breach of contract); Kewin v.
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 401, 295 N.W.2d 50 (1980) (damages for mental
anguish resulting from the insurer's bad faith refusal to pay disability benefits to the insured
not recoverable); Ross v. Holton, 640 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (damages recoverable
for breach of contract distinguished from damages recoverable for intentional interference
with a contractual relationship); Bumann v. Maurer, 203 N.W.2d 434 (N.D. 1972) (losses
sustained by buyer in attempted substitute endeavor not recoverable from breaching defendant).
Respected judges have argued that "contemplation" translates into foreseeability, covering both branches of the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale. See Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd.
v. Newman Indus., [1949] 2 K.B. 528, 539 (Asquith, L.J.); Kerr S.S. Co. v. Radio Corp. of
Am., 245 N.Y. 284, 288-91, 157 N.E. 140, 141-42 (1927) (Cardozo, C.J.). Foreseeability is
widely accepted as the standard for both general and special damages. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 351 and comments (1981); U.C.C. § 2-715 (1978) (using
the standard "had reason to know").
STATEMENT
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tation on damages.' In reality, the choice between the contract and
tort actions may be less significant than assumed.
Both in contract and in tort, courts must face the question of
remoteness. They must determine which consequences of the
breach of duty are too remote to be assigned to the actor's responsibility and, therefore, must be borne by the party on whom they fell.6
Additionally, courts must define the scope of a defendant's duty:
Was his obligation broad enough to encompass the plaintiff or the
plaintiff's particular losses?7 A narrower question is whether there
was any legal duty at all. The concept of foreseeability has been
used in the analysis of each of these issues.'
The standard theoretical formulations of the role of foreseeability in these two fields are: (1) In contract, foreseeability limits the
ambit of damages for which a breaching party is liable,9 and (2) in
tort, foreseeability defines whether the defendant owed a duty to the
plaintiff, and whether the injury sustained flowed proximately from
the defendant's tortious act.10
The traditional analyses of foreseeability in contract and tort
raise several questions. The initial question is whether foreseeability works the same in both contract and tort. Other questions follow: (1) If foreseeability does in fact operate differently in contract
and tort, are there clear criteria controlling how particular transactions are classified? (2) In the expanding area of no-fault liability,
particularly in that amalgam of tort and contract theories known as
products liability, can foreseeability usefully and legitimately control scope and remoteness questions? (3) If foreseeability is central
in fault theory but irrelevant in strict liability, is the fact that fore4. An interesting recent example is Young v. Abalene Pest Control Servs., 122 N.H.
287, 444 A.2d 514 (1982), where plaintiffs attempted to ground their action in tort in order to
recover for emotional distress caused by a termite inspector who breached his contractual
duty to inspect the house they were planning to buy. They were unsuccessful. The court
determined that the action was contractual and the emotional distress was not foreseeable as
a matter of law.
5. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 43 (discussing remoteness in
torts); E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 12.14 (effect of foreseeability in assessing contract
damages).
6. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 43, E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1,

§ 12.14.
7. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 43; E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1,
§ 12.14.
8. See, eg., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (foreseeability and duty in tort); Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854) (damages limited to
losses reasonably foreseen by both parties at initiation of contract).
9. See E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 12.14.
10. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 43.
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seeability is necessary for a normative standard a reason for selecting fault theories of liability over no-fault theories? (4) Should we
retain foreseeability in the analysis of liability or breach questions
but adopt a different approach to the problem of compensation or
recovery? This Article will explore these questions.
None of these questions can be addressed until a working definition of foreseeability is articulated. Although foreseeability has
been used in legal statements as if its meaning and scope are clear,
the vastness of the case law, statutes, and scholarly discussion has
produced confusion and contradictions.'1 This Article will first define foreseeability as a theoretical concept' 2 and then develop the
implications of that conceptual definition.' 3 Once that is accomplished the question of whether foreseeability is a valuable analytiresponsibility or remoteness of
cal tool for addressing issues of legal
4
consequences can be addressed.'
The conclusion reached is that foreseeability functions similarly
in contract and tort. The significant difference instead lies between
obligations which are based on strict liability and those arising
under traditional fault-based contract and tort theories. Foreseeability has both a justificatory and a practical role. Its justificatory
role is to legitimate the treatment of a defendant as one who has
violated a legal duty. Its practical function is to provide a device to
limit liability. Historically, foreseeability has performed, and continues to perform, both roles in fault-based liability. However, it
cannot perform either function in strict liability. As a result, a
strict liability system contains serious remoteness and cost
11. One manifestation of this lack of clarity is the struggle of the English courts to face
up to the ambiguities of foreseeability in the Hadley v. Baxendale rule. See Victoria Laundries (Windsor) Ltd. v. Newman Indus., Ltd., [1949] 2 K.B. 528; C. Czarnikov, Ltd. v.
Koufos (Heron II), [1969] 1 A.C. 350; and J. Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham &
Co., [1978] 1 All E.R. 525. Their disagreements and discussion have illuminated the
problems without furnishing clear solutions. American decisions have not yet reached that
stage. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 reporter's note (1981) (indicating that many of the cases on which the illustrative examples are based have counterexamples in the case law. The UCC permits the buyer to recover those consequential damages which the seller "had reason to know" would arise from the breach. U.C.C. § 2-715
(1979). But does "have reason to know" adopt the common law standard of foreseeability or
is it another standard? If it is a new standard, is it more or less rigid than the common law
provisions? When a concept is used in many different contexts without any attempt to indicate a meaning, there is bound to be uncertainty about not only the core meaning, but the
peripheral limits on the applicability of the concept.
12. See infra notes 17-75 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 76-110 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 111-51 and accompanying text.
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problems. 5 To the extent that modem civil liability is purely compensatory, foreseeability may be superfluous. The concept, however, is so central to a normative approach to law1 6 that we cannot
afford to view civil liability as solely a compensatory scheme.
I.

FORESEEABILITY

One method of establishing the content of a concept is to determine its meanings in either colloquial or technical usage.1 7 Foreseeability is not merely a legal term. Foreseeability is used in everyday
language to describe actual, subjective awareness of possible future
occurrences. It carries a sense of prevision, a consciousness of the
possibilities of future happenings, and also implies the ability to
plan for those future possibilities. A foresighted person sees into the
future and takes necessary precautions to protect himself and others
while taking advantage of opportunities. 8 Thus, foreseeability is an
integral part of prudent human behavior. To the extent that we
expect humans to be rational beings, they must be charged with
some degree of foreseeability.
In the context of moral analysis, the meaning of foreseeability
derives from its relationship to the concepts of choice and fault. If
an actor foresees a possible consequence harmful to himself or
others and, disregarding this foresight, acts in a way which allows
the avoidable harm to occur, his action would be condemned as
morally blameworthy. He would be said to be at fault. 9 When we
condemn someone for harming another, we may be saying he failed
to foresee a happening when he should have, or he foresaw the
event and made a bad choice.
15. See infra notes 111-34 and accompanying text.
16. Cf PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 1, at 6 ("[L]iability must be based on conduct which is socially unreasonable. The common thread woven into all torts is the idea of
unreasonable interference with the interests of others."). Foreseeability aids in establishing
the standard of expected conduct by determining when responsibility will extend to consequences of one's conduct. See id. § 31, at 169-73.
17. This is the standard methodology of the analytical jurisprudents. See Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 601 (1958). It was, of
course, a favorite method of H.L.A. Hart himself and appears in most of his writings. See,
e.g., Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence,70 LAW Q. REv. 37 (1954); Hart, Analytical Jurisprudencein Mid-Twentieth Century: A Reply to ProfessorBodenheimer, 105 U. PA.
L. REv. 953 (1957).
18. "Foresee," from which "foreseeability" is derived, is defined as the ability "[t]o see
beforehand, have prescience of [or] to exercise foresight, take care or precaution, make provision." 4 OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY 440 (1933).

19. We might mildly condemn his failure to take advantage of his opportunities but
would not consider his actions wrongful. See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 9-32
(1964) (distinguishing between the morality of duty and the morality of aspiration).
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The legal construct of foreseeability takes the moral analysis and
depersonalizes it. With the addition of that ubiquitous actor in
both contract and tort, the "reasonable" person, to the related concepts of foreseeability, choice, and fault, foreseeability becomes an
objective standard. The arguments for objective rather than subjective standards in law are well known.2 0 Among them are the administrative difficulties inherent in trying to prove subjective mental
states,2 1 the necessity of establishing normative or generalized standards of conduct,2 2 and the desire to protect the reasonable expectations of others who form those expectations on the assumptions that
the actor is a normal or average person and/or the actor's external
behavior reflects his subjective state.23 The first and second reasons
justify an objective standard in tort,24 while the third reason justifies an objective standard in contract.2 5
The movement from moral to legal analysis-from the subjective to the objective standard as a basis for ascribing liability-is
problematic. Within either framework, a person is culpable who,
although subjectively aware of a danger and capable of averting injury to another, failed to do so. Only under legal analysis, however,
is a subjectively unaware person treated as if he had actually known
of a danger when a reasonable person with normal faculties would
have been aware of it. In this instance, moral blame and legal liability part company. By imputing foreseeability to an unaware defendant, legal analysis expands the justification of liability beyond
personal wrongdoing.
Another type of foreseeability now widely used both in tort and
contract analysis is the foresight of economic man. Economic man
is a construct developed by economists to explain the functioning of
people inside a market model of economic behavior.2 6 Rational
20. A short, but sophisticated, presentation of this argument appears in Holmes, The
Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REv. 417 (1899).
21. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 32, at 177.
22. See id. § 32, at 173-74.

23. See id. § 33, at 193, 198; see generally id. § 32, at 173-75.
24. See 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, 86 (M. Howe ed. 1963) ("The law takes
no account of the infinite varieties of temperament, intellect, and education which make the
internal character of a given act so different in different men. It does not attempt to see men

as God sees them, for more than one sufficient reason.").
25. See 1 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CoNTRACTs §§ 94-95 (3d ed.
1957 & Supp. 1985) (test in interpretation of offer or acceptance is what reasonable people in
parties' positions would have thought was meant).
26. Economic man marches across the pages of Posnerian analysis. See R. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-14 (2d ed. 1977). Posner uses the concept of economic
man-"a rational maximizer of his ends in life," id. at 3-to demonstrate three propositions:
that a higher price will decrease the quantity demanded, since a rational purchaser will seek
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economic behavior consists of maximizing benefits and minimizing
costs by choosing the optimum or most efficient course of con-

duct.27 Foreseeability in the economic context requires projecting
the costs and benefits of possible future courses of action measured
in monetary terms.2 8 Economic man is commercially knowledgea-

ble, possesses or can obtain all necessary information, experiences
little difficulty in assessing the accurate monetary sum for each potential benefit or cost, and is coldly rational-unswayed by emotion,
apprehension, generosity or caprice-not only in calculating the
sum of these figures, but in choosing the most efficient
maximization.29
Neither economic man, moral man, nor reasonable (legal) man
are descriptive of actual behavior, but rather are prescriptive, setting forth the various standards of behavior against which real
human conduct can be measured. There is no inherent reason why
legal man could not be equated with economic man or with moral
man. Nevertheless, it is often assumed that the values of moral man
and those of economic man conflict.30 If so, legal man might be
equated with one or the other, but not with both. The legal consubstitutes, id. at 4-6; that a seller will not sell for less than the cost of the alternatives foregone to produce or obtain the product sold, since a rational seller would otherwise seek the
more valuable alternative, id. at 6-10; and that resources will be used so as to generate the
greatest value when resources may be freely shifted between uses, since a rational man will
attempt to get the most of what he has, id. at 7. Economic man is the central character in the
conflict between Professors Calabresi and Posner over strict liability versus fault liability. See
Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE LJ. 1055 (1972)
(criticizing fault liability for its assumption that men have perfect understanding of future
events in planning their behavior, so as to take the highest level of precaution consistent with
the balancing of cost of harm against cost of precaution); Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 205 (1973) (by imposing strict liability on the party best able to
predict the consequences of an action, incentive for other parties to take precautions is removed, even if the cooperation of those other parties is needed to implement the precautions
determined by the potentially liable party).
27. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977) (economic man is "a rational maximizer of his ends in life").
28. The three postulates of economics discussed by Posner, supra note 27, require perfect knowledge of future events, since the rational purchaser must know all available substitutes in deciding on purchases, the rational seller must be able to predict accurately the future
value of alternatives in determining his price, and the rational resource holder must be able to
predict perfectly the value of alternative uses of his resources before committing them to a
use. Cf. Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 26, at 1058 (pointing out the assumption of perfect
knowledge in his criticism of fault liability).
29. R. POSNER, supra note 27, at 3-14.
30. See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 266 (1970) ("The fault system is a
poor system of market control even disregarding the fact that it decides who shall bear losses
partly on the basis of moral considerations antithetical to pure market control of accident
costs.").
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struct, however, has its own specific meaning, since the lawyer is
concerned with narrower issues than the moralist, and broader ones
than the economist.3"
Another way to increase understanding of a legal concept such
as foreseeability is to determine its place in the web of relationships
between other legal concepts. Foreseeability is related to the general concept of fault. Throughout the nineteenth century and well
into the twentieth century, tort theory was based predominantly on
fault concepts.3 2 Although not normally described in this way,
nineteenth century contract theory was also fault-based. Under the
freedom of contract theory of that period, the obligor was said to
voluntarily assume the obligation.33 Once the contract was created,
the obligor was required to perform exactly and completely; very
34
few excuses for nonperformance were recognized by the courts.
Failure to perform the voluntarily assumed duty was characterized
as wrongful; that is, the breaching party was at fault.3 5
Fault was a pivotal notion in common law thinking during the
nineteenth century.36 Prior to the emergence of welfare institutions
and the widespread use of insurance, losses were borne by the per31. The law protects such intangible and non-quantifiable interests as family relations,
freedom of press, freedom from mental or psychological damage, and personal reputation,
which are difficult to fit into an economic framework without arbitrarily assigning dollar
values to these interests. The law uses equitable injunctions to protect such interests because
economic equivalents do not exist. Moral philosophy addresses issues which fall outside the
purview of law, either because there is no social interest at stake or due to the administrative
difficulty in establishing such an interest. Examples are the good samaritan problem in tort
and the issue of personal virtue which is of so much concern in ethics.
32. 0. W. HOLMES, supra note 24, at 63-129; Keeton, ConditionalFault in the Law of
Torts, 72 HARV. L. REv. 401, 401-05 (1959).
33. The voluntary assumption of an obligation remains a central concept in contract.
Nineteenth century law, however, failed to balance voluntariness with notions of fairness.
See Levin & McDowell, The Balance Theory of Contracts: Seeking Justice in Voluntary Obligations, 29 MCGILL L.. 24 (1983).
34. See E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 17, at 21.
35. This analysis lessens the importance of an asserted distinction between fault in tort
and contract-that fault in tort is the breach of duty, while fault in contract involves assuming a duty one cannot perform. To say that one must prove fault in tort but not in contract
merely demonstrates that it is more difficult to prove the breach in tort than the assumption
of the obligation in contract.
36. Basic pleading and procedure required an injured plaintiff to allege and prove some
justification for transferring his loss to the defendant. For many centuries, the necessary
justification was to allege and establish conduct on the part of the defendant which could well
be categorized, without linguistic or philosophical distortion, as blameworthy. Legal historians have debated whether tort law, prior to the middle of the nineteenth century, was faultbased or was based on notions of strict liability. Compare O.W. HOLMES, supra note 23, at 533 (viewing legal liability as historically fault-based) with Wigmore, Responsibiliyfor TortiousActs: ItsHistory, 7 HARV. L. REv. 315 (1894) (viewing strict liability as the basis of tort
law prior to the mid-nineteenth century).
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son on whom nature, fate or accident had caused them to fall, unless the sufferer could persuade the court to shift the cost to
someone else. 37 The most persuasive approach was to prove that
the losses were not the result of fate or accident but were caused by
the wrongful
act of the defendant; that is, the defendant was at
fault. 38

Fault, in both a legal and moral sense, occurs only when the
39
actor has a choice. If he is compelled to act in a particular way,
or only one course of action is open to him, his action cannot be
characterized as wrongful. There should be no responsibility for an

action, however harmful, absent an alternative course of action less
dangerous than the one pursued.
Foreseeability is the concept used to address the issue of the
scope of an actor's fault. If an opportunity for choice is necessary
before ascribing fault to an actor, choices can only be made as to

those consequences known to the actor before he committed himself." What must be foreseen? Is it that the action would be classified as wrongful by the legal system? Is it that someone would be
injured in some way by the act?4 ' Is it that this particular person
would be injured?4' Is it the occurrence of the particular damage
alleged by the plaintiff in his legal action?4 3 The theoretical and
37. See 0. W. HOLMES, supra note 23, at 42, 76-77.
38. Id.
39. Upholding a defense based on necessity or duress requires a finding of compulsion.
Compulsion is not a question of psychological reality, but a prescriptive judgment about what
legally constitutes absence of choice. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 24.
40. Holmes expressed this analysis:
[Tio a given human being anything is accident which he could not fairly have been
expected to contemplate as possible, and therefore to avoid. . . . Nay, why need
the defendant have acted at all, and why is it not enough that his existence has been
at the expense of the plaintiff? The requirement of an act is the requirement that the
defendant should have made a choice. But the only possible purpose of introducing
this moral element is to make the power of avoiding the evil complained of a condition of liability. There is no such power where the evil cannot be foreseen.
0. W. HOLMES, supra note 23, at 76-77 (citations omitted).
41. English contract law requires that the breaching party must have foreseen the serious possibility that his act would produce harm, but not that he had foreseen the particular
harm. See H. Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co., [1978] 1 All E.R. 525, 540
(Scarman, L.J.).
42. This was the issue in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99
(1928), which held that no duty was owed to an unforeseeable plaintiff. Id. at 345, 162 N.E.
at 101. Analyzing the problem in terms of causation, the dissent would have held the railroad liable. Id. at 356, 162 N.E. at 105.
43. This question may be thought to divide contract and tort. Liability for special damages in contract requires that the breaching party, at the time of contracting, could have
contemplated the particular losses. See, e-g., Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
The foreseeability limitation is not applicable in tort. See, e.g., Vosburg v. Putney, 80 Wis.
523, 50 N.W. 403 (1891).
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practical answers to the question of what must be foreseen are unclear in both contract and tort. Given the objective nature of the
inquiry, the law is not dealing with an empirical question, but a
hypothetical construct. What the court expects a defendant should
have foreseen is what the "reasonable man" would have foreseen.
The content of foreseeability may be further clouded because it
is usually a factual issue to be determined by a jury. Because juries
usually report only general verdicts, there is little empirical evidence concerning how the foreseeability issue is analyzed by the
jury. The theoretical content of foreseeability is contained either in
the judge's instructions and the rules on which they are based or in
the judge's control over the jury by his ruling as to whether or not
there exists a material factual issue to submit to the jury. Although
summary judgment rulings often implicitly involve the foreseeability question, the standards employed are not frequently articulated,
and thus the theoretical uncertainty remains.
In addition to identifying what the actor should be required to
foresee and making the factual determination of whether he did
foresee it, there is the element of the probability or likelihood of the
event occurring. Although, as one court recently said, "[I]n retrospect almost nothing is unforeseeable,"' foreseeability is used in
connection with choice. The actor should be liable if a reasonable
person would have acted to avoid the foreseeable injury. A reasonable choice to act one way or another entails balancing the cost of
the safer action times the likelihood of the perceived danger against
the magnitude of the potential injury and the benefits of the riskier
action. Thus, we expect reasonable operators of nuclear power
plants to take stringent safety precautions, even if the likelihood of a
serious leak of radiation is very slight, because of the enormous
damage that could occur. On the other hand, we do not expect a
film laboratory to inaugurate costly procedures to ensure that every
snapshot on a roll of Kodak Brownie film will be perfectly developed, for, even if the likelihood of laboratory error is appreciable,
the potential loss to a customer might merely be a bad print of the
sixth shot of the family dog.
While this balancing calculation could be consciously made, it is
for most actors a kind of intuitive, semiconscious judgment.4 5 It is
44. Mieher v. Brown, 54 Ill. 2d 539, 544, 301 N.E.2d 307, 309 (1973).
45. Recent English cases have used varying terminology while struggling to frame a
standard of probability. See, eg., Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd. v. Newman Indus.,
[1949] 1 All E.R. 997, 1004 ("[Ihe true criterion is surely not what was bound 'necessarily'
); Czarnikow Ltd. v. Koufos (Heron II),
to result, but what was likely or liable to do so ....
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presumably determined in much the same fashion by jurors or
judges acting as factfinders. This matter of probabilities and balancing is subsumed under the "reasonable" qualifier in the standard,
"what a reasonable person would have foreseen," yet its issues are

distinct from those required in determining whether or not injury to
persons or property is a possible outcome. As with many other
common law concepts, the concept of foreseeability remains vague
and open-textured, in spite of many cases involving foreseeability.
This open-textured quality permits courts to apply rules of law containing the foreseeability concept to wide-ranging factual situations,
thereby achieving individualized results without violating a
predefined constraint.
The purpose of the foreseeability concept is to define the point
on the continuum between responsibility and remoteness beyond
which the defendant has no liability. In tort, this is the point where
there is no duty because the defendant could not foresee that his act
would cause injury;4 6 in contract, this is the point where no obligation is assumed because the defendant could not foresee that anyone
would treat his actions as creating an obligation.4 7 If that point is
placed at the beginning of the continuum, the actor would bear no
obligation. Instead, society would bear the burden of protecting itself from all injury, either remote or proximate, resulting from the
actor's behavior. If the boundary is placed at the other end of the
continuum, the actor would be responsible for all damages causally
linked to his actions. This would constitute an intolerably expan[1967] 3 All E.R. 686, 694 ("It has never been held to be sufficient in contract that the loss
was foreseeable as 'a serious possibility' or 'a real danger' or as being 'on the cards.' "); H.
Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co., [1978] 1 All E.R. 525, 526 ("What
amounted to a 'serious possibility' [is] a question of fact to be decided by the application of
common sense to the particular circumstances."). Among the terms considered throughout
these cases are: "serious possibility," a "real danger," "liable to result," "on the cards," "very
substantial degree of probability," and "foreseeable as a likely result." American courts, less
interested in linguistic precision, address probability as a component of reasonableness and
foreseeability to be determined by the factfinder without any more precise guidance. E.g.,
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 101 (1928); Mieher v. Brown,
54 Ill. 2d 539, 544, 301 N.E.2d 307, 309 (1973).
46. This is the effect of linking foreseeability to duty. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.,
248 N.Y. 339, 342, 162 N.E. 99, 99-100 (1928). A similar result is achieved by categorizing a
controversy as contractual rather than tortious and then applying privity concepts. See, e.g.,
Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842) (plaintiff injured while driving unsafe
mail coach; defendant not liable to plaintiff because contract to provide and maintain coaches
was between defendant and plaintiff's employer).
47. This issue arises in cases where the plaintiff alleges an implied contract based on the
defendant's conduct. This may also explain those cases where the court finds that the plaintiff's services were gratuitous because the defendant receiving those services reasonably felt
the plaintiff had no expectation of payment.
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sive burden upon the actor. Generally, the boundary is drawn
somewhere in the middle of the continuum, separating remote consequences for which there is no liability from proximate consequences for which the defendant is liable. While such limits might
be drawn based on actual or constructive foresight, foreseeability
may merely be a mask for policy decisions.
One policy at work is to protect certain defendants and enterprises. The original policy of protecting developing entrepreneurial
activity in the early stages of industrialization4 8 is no longer applicable to our developed industries, but, in a sense, the problem is still
with us. All human activity carries risk. Given the destructive potential of modem technology, the prospective ambit of that danger
can be enormous. Drawing the liability boundary to include all outcomes bearing simple cause-in-fact relationships to the defendant
will have dire economic consequences. If defendants must pay
judgments from personal assets, many individuals and small businesses may be forced out of the market or into bankruptcy. Fear of
this possibility may compel entrepreneurs and individuals to act
very cautiously, becoming risk-averse rather than risk-preferring.
One policy choice can be to weigh the societal desirability of the
defendant's activity against the harm done to the injured plaintiff
or, stated more broadly, to weigh the advantage of having daring,
creative and unconventional personalities against the costs of their
experimental activity. Drawing the line close to the act in order to
minimize liability will favor creative, risky activity over victims.
Drawing the line far from the act to include liability for most losses
caused by the action will encourage cautious, conventional, riskaverse activity.4 9
A related policy choice arises from the fact that the best protection against ruinous liability is the defendant's size or wealth. The
larger the business or the wealthier the individual, the better its ability to survive the impact of a single, very large damage award.
Drawing the line to increase the extent of liability will more ad48. Both the foreseeability limitation of Hadley v. Baxendale and the privity defense
have been explained as mechanisms for protecting industrial development. See R. DANZiG,
THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN CoNTRACr LAW 84-105 (1978).

49. This has become a standard criticism of expanded medical malpractice liability.
Many doctors are reportedly practicing defensive medicine by avoiding risky procedures and
by scheduling expensive and detailed preliminary tests to prepare a record should there be
litigation. See, e.g., Altschule, Bad Law, Bad Medicine, 3 AM. J. L. & MED. 295, 296 (1977)
("Now, the malpractice crisis often is forcing even those physicians whose own good judg-

ment formerly would have prevented them from utilizing excessive laboratory tests to resort
to such tests in self-defense.").
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versely affect moderately wealthy individuals and smaller enterprises. Such a demarcation inherently favors magnitude and
centralization of wealth and power.
Transferring the risk to professional insurers may seem to alleviate these problems, but insurance is, nevertheless, a cost. The high
risk associated with certain activities may force any rational actor
to carry large amounts of insurance. Because the cost of insurance
may exceed the price which the market will pay for the activity, the
activity may cease to be provided.5 °
At this stage in the inquiry, one might ask: why not abandon
50. A good example is the cost of medical malpractice insurance. In the early 1970's,
substantial increases in the number of malpractice claims and awards caused many insurance
companies to completely withdraw from the medical malpractice market. Wasman, Spiraling
Costs: A Health CareSlide, 11 TRIAL 23 (1975). Companies still willing to provide insurance
raised their premiums and simultaneously reduced their coverage of doctors in "high-risk"
specialties, leading to a crisis in the availability and cost of insurance coverage. See eg.,
Note, MedicalMalpracticeLegislation: The Kansas Response to the Medical MalpracticeCrisis, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 566, 566-68 (1984).
Recent increases in the number of malpractice actions filed and in professional liability
premiums have led some to believe that the U.S. again faces a medical malpractice "crisis"
similar to the one experienced a decade ago. Korcok, Curbing the US. MedicalMalpractice
Crisis, 131 CANADIAN MED. A.J. 645, 645 (1984). A growing number of doctors are said to
be leaving "high-risk" specialties such as obstetrics and neurosurgery in response to skyrocketing liability premiums. Id. See also Kiss, DoctorsNeed Protection, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31,
1983, at A27, col. 5; cf Sullivan, Two State Hospital Officials Say InsuranceRates Threaten
Their Departments,N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1985, at B3, col. 1 (neurosurgical chairmen at two
university medical centers fear that increased malpractice insurance premiums will force
them to disband their departments and leave the teaching profession). But see Again the
Malpractice Crunch, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1985, at A18, col. 1 (underlying problem of the
recent crisis is number of frivolous suits filed, estimated to be one-third of total number of
claims).
Insurance premiums have increased more than 131% in the last ten years. Korcok,
supra, at 645. In some areas, a neurosurgeon can pay as much as $63,000 per year in liability
insurance premiums. Obstetricians and gynecologists pay at least $15,000 per year, with
some paying more than $70,000 annually. Id. These high premium costs are causing some
doctors to leave these areas of practice. Id. at 648-49.
The crisis in the early 1970's prompted almost all states to enact or consider legal reforms
in the hope of stabilizing medical malpractice premiums. For a summary of state legislative
efforts, see Grossman, State-by-State Summary of Legislative Activities on Medical Malpractice, in A LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE TO THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ISSUE 12 (D. Warren & R.
Merrit eds. 1976); see also Comment, An Analysis of StateLegislative Responses to the Medical
MalpracticeCrisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417; Comment, Recent MedicalMalpracticeLegislation
- A First Checkup, 50 TUL. L. REv. 655 (1976).
Legislative efforts have attempted to guarantee the availability of insurance by creating
joint underwriting associations and by modifying the tort law applicable to malpractice actions. Grossman, supra, at 7-10. One of the most controversial measures is the imposition of
a ceiling on the amount of damages recoverable by medical malpractice victims. For a discussion of these statutes, see Note, Statutes Limiting Medical MalpracticeDamages, 1982
FED. INS. Q. 248; Note, Patient Compensation Funds: Legislative Responses to the Medical
Malpractice Crisis, 5 AM. J. L. & MED. 175 (1979).
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foreseeability altogether and make liability the subject of an open
policy analysis? The counter-argument is that foreseeability is an
important concept in its own right. It forces a court to consider,
from the defendant's perspective, whether the actor should have
been aware of the future risks and could have avoided harm. This
requires an assessment of how rational, prudent, and free from
blame the defendant's actions were. Unless the factors of rational
expectations, fault-whether legal or moral-and normative goals
are to be disregarded in determining civil liability, foreseeability

must remain a central inquiry.
In addition to definition by usage, location by conceptual context, or explanation by policy objectives, the content of foreseeabil-

ity may be controlled by the legal element with which it is
connected. To impose liability in tort, the complaining party must
establish: (1) a legal duty, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) damage to
the complaining party, and (4) a causal connection between breach
and damage."1 Contract litigation and doctrine focus, however, primarily on the first and third of these elements;52 tort litigation and
51. Traditional theory in both fields assumes that these are necessary elements. See
Green, Foreseeabilityin Negligence Law, 61 COL. L. REv. 1401 (1961). Much of the struggle
in the development of tort theory in the twentieth century has concerned ways in which the
elements, particularly the breach, may be established. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine allows
breach to be established by inference. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453,
150 P.2d 436 (1944) (plaintiff can recover under res ipsa loquiturif able to prove that defendant had exclusive control over production of the instrumentality and the instrumentality had
not changed after it left defendant's possession); Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154
P.2d 687 (1944) (patient injured while unconscious on operating table may recover under res
ipsa loquiturdoctrine although unable to identify which members of surgical team caused the
injury). Modern products liability theory goes one step further, allowing breach to be established primarily from the fact that the injury occurred. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTs § 402A (1965).
52. Much early contract litigation, focusing on the elements of offer, acceptance, consideration, or implied contract, concerned whether or not a contractual obligation had been
assumed. See, eg., L. FULLER & M. EISENBERG, BASIc CONTRACT LAW 1-47, 318-51 (4th
ed. 1981) and cases cited therein. Breach is usually a straightforward factual question. Modem contract litigation is more often concerned with the type and magnitude of remedies
available to the plaintiff. A complex body of legal rules governs such matters as general and
special damages, expectation, restitution and reliance formulae, stipulated damage clauses,
and specific performance. These damage problems have produced the bulk of modern scholarly discussions in contract. See id. at 168-317 and cases cited therein.
The final element-the causal connection between breach and damage-is rarely treated
in litigation or scholarly discourse. Were courts to focus on causation in contract litigation,
they would analyze cases in terms of proximate cause, as in tort. Since proximate cause,
however, is the element used to eliminate liability for remote consequences, that purpose is
adequately achieved in contract by the principle of Hadley v. Baxendale. Denial of recovery
for unforeseen special damages has rendered the causation issue largely superfluous in
contract.
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rules emphasize the second and fourth.5 3
If foreseeability is connected to damages, it offers the greatest
flexibility in dealing with the remoteness problem. Under this approach, some injuries or losses are not recoverable because they are
not foreseeable. If foreseeability is connected to causation, it is
more difficult to separate a particular plaintiff's losses into recoverable and nonrecoverable if the wrongful act, in fact, caused all
losses. If foreseeability is attached to the duty, it may determine
whether a particular plaintiff was within the range of harm but not
whether all of the plaintiff's damages are recoverable. Thus, the
contract doctrine approach appears to give the court more flexibility and control over the specifics of remoteness questions than do
54
the choices made in tort.
Foreseeability's attachment to damages in contract and to causation in tort was not an historical accident. Until the turn of the
century, contract theory specified that the only party who could enforce a contractual obligation was the promissee or obligee in whom
the right to the obligation was created; in other words, the plaintiff
53. Several standards are generally applicable to the tort element of duty, depending on
the cause of action. For instance, in negligence cases, the standard is ordinary reasonable
care. Given the general, nontechnical nature of the duty standard, establishing the breach
generally entails factual issues to be resolved by a jury. Damages are usually more straightforward, merely requiring the factfinder to assess the extent of plaintiff's losses.
Some of the most difficult legal problems in tort occur in the element of causation. If the
conduct of the defendant was tortious and there was damage suffered by the plaintiff, was
that damage proximately caused by the wrongful act? Although the precise meaning ofproximate cause is the subject of some dispute, see Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 453-54, 107
N.W.2d 859, 860 (1961) ("There is no subject in the field of law upon which more has been
written with less elucidation than that of proximate cause."), the determination of proximate
cause turns on a combination of cause-in-fact, foreseeability of ensuing events, and the existence of independent intervening causes occurring between defendant's breach of a tort duty
and plaintiff's damage. See Texas & Pacific Ry. v. McCleery, 418 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tex.
1967) (using "but-for" test to determine whether or not a train's excessive speed was proximate cause of collision).
54. The perspective from which foreseeability is judged distinguishes contract from tort.
Contract is concerned with true foresight, examining those consequences which the promisor
could have foreseen at the time of contracting. Tort is concerned with hindsight, an evaluation of an event after it has happened. Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 456, 107 N.W.2d
859, 862 (1961). The Dellwo court held that foreseeability is not the proper test for proximate
cause, but rather that proximate cause turns on whether the loss was the natural and probable
result of the tortious act. Nevertheless, foreseeability remains a dominant aspect of tort analysis. Negligence is premised upon the existence of a duty, which is in turn premised upon
whether the actor could have foreseen the likelihood of injury. There is, however, a more
fundamental objection to this purported distinction between contract and tort. To a reasonable person, foreseeability is always a prescriptive standard to be used after the event to judge
the defendant's action. A prescriptive evaluation carries with it a hindsight judgment. All
human actors know the inevitability of being so judged by events as well as by other humans.
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had to be in privity with the defendant. 5 If a court felt there were
policy reasons for limiting the promissor's liability while permitting
the promissee some recovery, it had to distinguish among the various kinds of damages suffered by this single promisee.
Nineteenth century tort litigation had a different quality, since
many people could be injured in a chain begun by a single tortious
act. The negligence of a manufacturer of a stage coach could cause
a wheel to break, injuring the driver, a passenger, the horses owned
by the stage coach owner, a driver of a passing carriage struck by
the stage coach, a bystander who was struck by a trunk thrown off
the roof, the bystander's pregnant wife who suffers emotional distress at seeing her husband injured, and the baby born prematurely
because of the mother's distress. 6 If a court desired to limit a
tortfeasor's liability to something less than all the damage caused,
the duty element was a convenient and natural place to draw the
line. Some injured parties could recover; others could not.
In the twentieth century, more people can enforce a contract
obligation. This was accomplished in part by using third-party beneficiary concepts, 7 and in part by abandoning the privity defense in
breach of warranty actions.5 " Thereafter, solving remoteness issues
for all contract cases by looking only to the damage element became
unnecessary. In those situations where the cause of action could be
classified as tort or contract, the remoteness problems seem to call
for a similar treatment.
Based upon the foregoing discussion and various approaches to
conceptual formation, I propose the following definition of foreseeability: Foreseeability is such awareness of the serious possibility
55. With the acceptance of the third-party beneficiary doctrine, the issue of remoteness
of parties became serious. Liability was limited by examining the intent of the promisee and
promisor to determine whether a particular person was intended to have a right to enforce
the contract. ERg., Isbrandtsen Co. v. Local 1291 of Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 204 F.2d
495 (3d Cir. 1953). The analysis bears strong similarity to the scope of duty analysis in
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.RL, 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
56. This is an expansion of the fact situation in the classic case of Winterbottom v.
Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842), in which the Court of Exchequer severely limited the
potential liability by classifying the action as contractual and using the privity defense to cut
off all liability except to the contracting party.
57. The process began with Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859) and has continued.
See F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 1116-60 (1970).
58. The case most cited for this development is Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), in which an automobile manufacturer was held liable for
injuries resulting from a defective vehicle, despite the fact that the manufacturer had contractually prohibited such liability. The same result is dictated by U.C.C. § 2-318 (1977),
although three variations with differing reaches are offered for selection by state legislatures.
See id. comments 2 & 3.
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that harmful consequences would ensue from a projected action
that a reasonable and decent person would either choose to act in a
way that avoids such harm or else could not voluntarily accept responsibility for the consequences of such harm.
This is formulated to clearly state the conditions of knowledge
upon which we should ascribe legal blame. "Serious possibility" is
used to recognize that this is not merely a matter of simple perception or awareness, but involves balancing all observations. It is ultimately not a perception but a judgment. "Decent" modifies
reasonable person to make explicit that this is more than an eco
nomic cost-benefit analysis, since moral and legal interests which
may not be purely utilitarian or efficient are a part of any such judgment. The alternative "avoid such harm" or "voluntarily accept
responsibility for the consequences" is to build in both generalized
tort obligations and individualized contract duties, in order to suggest that the concept is the same in both fields. The most problematic part of the formula is "choose to act," and it is now necessary
to discuss what is meant by choice.
II.

CHOICE

Both legal and social attitudes about the meaning of choice have
shifted markedly from the nineteenth to the late twentieth century.
Nineteenth century legal, social, and moral systems relied heavily
on the values of individuality, personal responsibility, and fault.5 9
Contractual duties were assumed to arise from a voluntary undertaking by an autonomous, rational, and prudent adult of adequate
economic means. 60 A person reluctant to accept responsibility for
meticulously carrying out a contractual undertaking had four
choices: (1) refuse to assume the obligation, (2) condition his undertaking in such a way that all or part of the risk would be assumed knowingly by the other party, 61 (3) charge more for the
additional or unusual risk,62 or (4) insure against the risk. Had the
59. While I view this as essentially a nineteenth century view, it is very similar to contemporary attitudes of neo-classical economists and of Posnerian legal analysis. My characterization of these views as nineteenth century, and therefore outmoded, may well reflect my
personal biases about these contemporary thinkers.
60. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
61. See, ag., Mayfair Fabrics v. Henley, 48 N.J. 483, 226 A.2d 602 (1967) (negligent
landlord not responsible for tenant's losses where lease specified tenant would bear such

losses).
62. See Kerr S.S. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 245 N.Y. 284, 157 N.E. 140 (1927)
(amount charged is evidence for determining whether a normal or unusual risk was assumed
by the defendant).
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risk not been foreseeable, however, none of these options could have
been selected by a rational planner. Without an opportunity for
such election, a contract theory of liability based on choice and consent should logically conclude that the risk was not a part of the
duty assumed.63
Because tort duty is imposed by law, the conclusion drawn by
the preceding analysis-that foreseeability should limit consensual
liability-initially appears to have no application in tort law, but
potential tortfeasors did have three choices. The most obvious option for the nineteenth century actor occurred at the point of potential wrongdoing. Tort duties do not require impossible conduct.
The cost of acting so carefully that little or no risk of harm is created may often be very high. 64 Choosing not to act carefully because the cost of prudent action is too expensive is an autonomous
choice, analogous to the contractual act.
A second choice is the possibility of an exculpatory contract. If
the legal system permits a possible victim to waive in advance his
right to sue for legal negligence,6 5 the potential tortfeasor can only
negotiate such a waiver or release for those actions which could
foreseeably produce such injury.
The third option is to purchase insurance. The more one elects
to lead a risk-preferring lifestyle; the wiser it is to insure against
those risks. The choice as to type and amount of insurance can only
be made, however, for those risks which are foreseeable.
In nineteenth century tort and contract analysis, the defendant
was regarded as having made choices. If he made bad choices leading to foreseeable harm to the plaintiff, then the defendant was at
fault. This personal responsibility for the wrong choice was a sufficient, and perhaps the only, acceptable ground for making him pay
the injured plaintiff.
Attitudes about choice are very different in the late twentieth
century. Complex and interdependent social organizations have
made most human activity collective rather than individual.6 6 Psychoanalytic and psychological theory as well as ongoing biological
63. A similar conclusion with regard to tort duty was reached in Palsgraf v. Long Island
L P., 248 N.Y. 339, 342, 162 N.E. 99, 99 (1928) ("If no hazard was apparent to the eye of
ordinary vigilance, an act innocent and harmless, at least to outward seeming... did not
take to itself the quality of a tort because it happened to be a wrong .... ").
64. This is not solely an economic or cost-benefit analysis. It can refer to lifestyle and
personality values. A person who is risk-preferring obviously pays a higher psychological
cost in living a prudent, safe life than one who is risk-averse.
65. See E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 333-35 (1982) and cases cited therein.
66. Two studies which argue that this is the inevitable result of modem technological
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research have cast doubt on the degree to which human choices are
rational or controllable. 67 Rapidly evolving technology with unpredictable side effects causes unexpected and immense losses. All of
this combines to leave modem commentators uncomfortable when
talking about personal fault. If they feel uneasy about ascribing
moral blame to complex interdependent actions with unpredictable
consequences, then they are even less sure about using blame as a
basis for transferring losses from the victim to an actor. This uneasiness about personal autonomy and personal blame has contributed
to the attitude that modem tort theory is less concerned with minimizing harmful activity and more interested in compensating
victims.

68

The de-emphasis of personal fault still leaves the twentieth century actor with the important choice of insuring against risks.
While a person may not be blamed for injuring another, he will
surely be blamed if he does not have the foresight to insure against a
known possibility. A person may occasionally drive carelessly without being regarded as abnormal or dangerous. If, however, he
drives uninsured, he will be regarded as foolish and seriously
blameworthy.6 9
In order to prudently insure against risks, a certain level of foresight is necessary. A reasonable person should not only foresee the
"serious possibility" 70 of an injury, but should know enough to be
able to buy the type of coverage needed and set the policy limits
high enough to cover losses. The foresight to insure should often be
development and economic and social organization are: J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUsTRIAL STATE (1967) and J. ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY 79-147 (1964).

67. Perhaps the best known modem exponent of this position is B.F. Skinner. See B.F.
SKINNER, SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1953); J. ELLUL, supra note 66, at 318-87.
68. Manifestations of this shift include the widespread use of liability insurance to eliminate personal cost to the tortfeasor, the increasing use of no-fault insurance concepts, which
eliminate any pretense of responsibility by the actor, and expansion of no-fault theories, such
as products liability. See J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 32-37 (2d ed.
1981).
69. See Keeton, ConditionalFault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REV. 401, 427-28
(1959), which suggests that there is a community sense of morality which ascribes blameworthiness in the following fashion:
It is the moral sense of the community that one should not engage in this type of
conduct, because of risk or certainty of losses to others, without making reasonable
provision for compensation of losses. But if he makes such provision, his conduct is
permissible.
70. "Serious possibility" is a term taken from the opinion of Scarman, L.J, in H. Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co., [1978] 1 All E.R. 525, 536 ("[I]n an action for
damages for breach of contract the plaintiff's loss must be such as may reasonably be supposed would have been in the contemplation of the parties as a serious possibility had their
attention been directed to the possibility of a breach which has, in fact, occurred.").
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expected of the victim as well as the actor. Assuming the availability of insurance for the quantifiable risks of both actors and potential victims, four theoretical situations are possible:
(1) The actor has or should have adequate liability insurance, and
the victim is uninsured;
(2) The actor has no liability insurance, but the victim has or
should have adequate accident or property insurance;
(3) Both foresaw or should have foreseen the risk, and both carry
insurance;
(4) The risk was not foreseeable to either party, and neither has
insurance.
If we abandon fault analysis, cases one and two are easy to resolve. The insurance compensates the injured party, and that closes
the matter.7 1
Case three is a situation of inefficiency, since more insurance is
or ought to have been purchased72 than is needed for compensation.
Foreseeability cannot adequately eliminate this inefficiency. Some
form of social consensus or legal regulation should decide the responsibility of each party in the situation where foreseeability of
harm and foreseeability of danger overlap, and both the actor and
victim are insured.7 3 One argument for placing the obligation on
the victim is based on efficiency, asserting that potential victims can
insure themselves for the least cost, since they can best assess the
value of their property, health, or life. 74 Actors, however, must
purchase sufficient liability insurance to compensate the most ex71. To avoid the necessity of establishing fault through litigation requires barring the
first-party insurer of the victim from subrogating itself to the victim's rights against the
tortfeasor. Discussions about abolishing the analogous collateral source rule so that the
tortfeasor may be credited with collateral benefits, including first-party insurance, require
barring the right of subrogation in the provider of the collateral benefit. See Fleming, The
CollateralSource Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1478 (1966).
72. Case three, which demonstrates overinsurance, poses a clear theoretical choice. If a
person has the responsibility of insuring against a risk and elects to take the chance of carrying no or insufficient insurance, he may be left with the consequences of that choice. This
situation seldom occurs, since many actors and many victims are underinsured. The limited
insurance of a liability policy and the limited insurance of an accident policy may have to be
combined to fully compensate the victim.
73. Some worry that an injured party might actually profit from an injury. The goal of
both tort and contract should be to award full compensation, but no more, to an injured
plaintiff. This goal may be reinforced by the operation of the collateral source rule in tort.
See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 920A(2) (1965) and comments. Permitting subrogation in favor of the collateral benefit providers is designed to avoid overcompensation to the
injured party. The problem in tort, much more so than in contract, is the practical difficulty
of determining exactly what is full and fair compensation.
74. One view suggests that the Hadley rule in contract functions to place the risk on
parties who can best be informed about a potential problem and can avoid its consequences at
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pensive potential risks.75
In case four, no particular legal result is clearly appropriate.
This could be resolved by the common law principle that the loss
should fall on the victim. Since the loss was not foreseeable, the
actor was under no obligation either to act carefully or to buy insurance. Thus, the actor did not have the kind of fault that would
justify transferring the loss to him to be paid out of his personal
assets.
III.

CATEGORIZATION

Classifying the plaintiff's cause of action as tort or as contract
may invoke different concepts of foreseeability. This raises difficulties in borderline cases. The area of overlap in which borderline
cases occur may be narrow or broad, depending largely on the conceptual definitions of tort and contract. 76 A willful breach of contract, where the promisor knows or should know it will cause harm,
could well be analyzed as tort. Every contract breach where the
failure of performance was caused by negligence might be treated as
a borderline case.77 Protection of the reliance interest, originally
done primarily in tort,7 but now widely protected in contract under
promissory estoppel notions,7 9 also could be viewed as an overlap
least cost. See Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 955-59 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner,
J.).
75. The widespread adoption of no-fault automobile insurance, the suggestion that nofault insurance might be used in medical malpractice, and the trend towards abolition of the
collateral source rule in medical malpractice actions indicate that the social process of making this choice in favor of first-party protection rather than third-party liability insurance is
well under way.
76. Cf K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 346 n.
315b (1960):
One recalls also from the Legal Apocrypha: "And the Lord said: Let there be contracts and let there be torts. And it was so. And He divided contracts from torts.
And darkness, etc." How apocryphal this notion of the nature of things is, our
small samplings show: Washington, 1940, shows tort and contract merging in regard to bad food; Washington, 1958, builds a principle of proof of damages which
covers contract and tort alike; Ohio, 1957, is breaking the warranty action loose
from "privity" in regard to an electric cooker; New York, 1958, is spreading actionable misrepresentation over into the field of contract formation-not with respect to
out-of-pocket "reliance" damages, but with respect to lost-bargain damages, as
well-Yet the Legal Apocrypha still wield vicious power.
If this passage is read broader than discussing penumbral or borderline problems, then it
seems wrong. Tort and contract are not one. They are two different fields of legal liability
with different problems and different sources of obligation. See infra text accompanying
notes 103-12.
77. See Evans v. Yegen Assocs., 556 F. Supp. 1219, 1226 (D. Mass. 1982) (Keeton, J.).
78. See 3 T. STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 173-75 (1906); Ames,
The History ofAssumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1888).
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
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area.
An example of overlap is the compulsory contract situation
where a customer sues a public utility or a common carrier for
harm caused by negligently providing service. The New York
Court of Appeals faced such an issue in Kerr S.S. Co. v. Radio Corp.
of America. 0 The plaintiff, a ship owner, cabled a coded message
through the defendant to the plaintiff's agent in Manila."1 This
message contained instructions about loading freight.8 2 Because of
the defendant's negligence, the message was not delivered, and the
plaintiff lost the substantial freight charges it would have collected
from the shipper.8 3 The plaintiff failed to persuade the court that
this loss of freight was sufficiently foreseeable at the time of accepting the message so as to meet the standard of Hadley v. Baxendale14 The plaintiff then contended that his cause of action was
really tort and that therefore the contract limitation did not apply."
Justice Cardozo, writing for the court, rejected this argument,
stating:
Though the duty to serve may be antecedent to the contract, yet
the contract when made defines and circumscribes the duty
....
[T]here is little trace of a disposition to make the measure
of the liability dependent on the form of action. A different question would be here if the plaintiff were seeking reparation for a
wrong unrelated to the contract, as e.g., for a refusal to accept a
message .... 86
Thus, faced with a case in the area of overlap, Cardozo chose to
categorize it as contract and apply the more limited liability.
Products liability is an increasingly important borderline area.
In a typical products liability action, the injured party sues the retailer, wholesaler, or manufacturer of goods to recover for injuries
or losses caused by a defective product.8 7 Products liability theory
is a blend of warranty liability from contract, and negligence rules
from tort.8 8
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

245 N.Y. 284, 157 N.E. 140 (1927).
Id at 286, 157 N.E. at 140.
Id. at 287, 157 N.E. at 141.
Id
Id. at 288, 157 N.E. at 141.
Id. at 292, 157 N.E. at 142.
Id., 157 N.E. at 143.

87. R.D. HURSH & H.J. BAILEY, 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1.1 (2d

ed. 1974).
88. For an overview of products liability theory, see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1,

§§ 95A-98.
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A recent English case89 demonstrates the joint operation of tort
and contract elements in products liability litigation. The plaintiff,
a farmer, purchased a hopper (a grain storage device) manufactured
and installed by the defendants. 90 The defendants installed the hopper with its ventilator taped closed. 91 Because of improper ventilation, the feed stored in the hopper became moldy, and some animals
contracted an intestinal infection. 92 The resulting loss of the livestock was valued at 36,000 English pounds. 93
After a complex and difficult trial, the plaintiff recovered his entire loss. 94 In rendering judgment, the trial judge found that:
(1) the plaintiff's action was contractual, brought to recover for a
breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose;
(2) the animals' illness was caused by the moldy food; (3) the plaintiff could not have foreseen that the food would cause the illness;
and (4) the defendant manufacturer did not foresee the possibility of
harm under the Hadley v. Baxendale formulation. 9
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. 96 In
view of the fact that the plaintiff's action was contractual, the finding that the defendant's knowledge did not meet the test of Hadley
v. Baxendale posed a serious problem. Lords Denning and Scarman
agreed that "the amount of damages recoverable does not depend
on whether the plaintiff's cause of action is breach of contract or
tort for, in principle, the test of remoteness of damage is the same in
contract as in tort . . . .
Lord Denning discerned from prior cases98 an emerging rule
that recovery of lost profits was limited by the contract rule while
recovery for physical injury to a plaintiff's person and property were
governed by tort principles.99 Lords Orr and Scarman found no
such distinction but reached the same result by construing the Eng89. H. Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co., [1978] 1 All E.R. 525.
90. Id. at 529.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 530.
94. Id.
95. The trial judge found that defendant manufacturers could not at the time of contract
reasonably have contemplated that there was either a very substantial degree of
possibility or a real danger or serious possibility that the feeding of mouldy pig nuts
in the condition described by Mr. Parsons would cause illness in the pigs that ate
them, even on an intensive farm such as that of the plaintiffs.
Id
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id at 541.
Id.
Id. at 532-34.
Id.
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lish law on contract damages to require only that the defendant
foresee, at the time of contracting, the serious possibility that an
injury-for example, that illness caused by consumption of moldy
food-would be caused by a breach."°° It was not necessary that
the defendant foresee the type, degree or extent of the injury. This
formulation is close to accepting the tort standard in contract.
Both the New York and English courts agreed that the standard
limiting damages should not differ whether the action is viewed as
contract or tort. The courts differed, however, when faced with the
problem of categorizing a borderline fact situation; the New York
court chose the contract measure, 101 while the English court opted
for the tort standard."0 2
One major problem in contemporary contract and tort theory is
the issue of whether there are two separate fields of liability or only
one.10 3 When important consequences depend on whether a case is
classified as tort or contract," 4 it might seem obvious that we are
dealing with two separate fields. If, however, theoretical analysis
says the two fields are essentially only one, then the differing consequences flowing from the meaningless categories should be abandoned. Must we maintain two separate regimes of liability just
because the statute of limitations period is longer for one than for
the other? Perhaps we should instead ask whether it makes sense to
have differing limitation periods.
Foreseeability poses a similar question.10 5 Should we maintain
100. Id. at 534-41.
101. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
103. One school of contemporary contract theorists, the so-called "tort-theorists," argue
that the theories of liability based on reliance notions are essentially the same in both contract
and tort. Major figures in this school are Grant Gilmore and Patrick Atiyah. See, eg., G.
GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CoNTRACT 87 (1974) (contract becoming reabsorbed into tort);
P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRAcT 750-64 (1979) (stressing

movement away from consent as basis of liability even in situations classified as contractual).
For a criticism of this position and an argument that the two fields are separate in theory, see
Levin & McDowell, supra note 33, at 58-61.
104. In addition to foreseeability as a limitation on damage recovery, other distinctions
between contract and tort include shorter statutes of limitations in tort, the availability of
punitive damages in tort but not in contract, the degree to which liability can be waived or
exculpated, and the existence of strict liability in contract contrasted with the requirement
that fault must be proven in negligence.
105. The English bar and bench have been much concerned with whether the remoteness
test is the same in contract and tort. In a fascinating line of cases, the English courts have
tried to define foreseeability in contract and tort. See Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd. v.
Newman Indus., [1949] 2 K.B. 528 (foreseeable that breach of contract to deliver a boiler on
a set date would result in lost profits to the buyer); Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts
Dock & Eng'g Co. (Wagon Mound 1), [1961] A.C. 388 (not foreseeable that oil spilled from
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tort and contract as separate fields simply because the foreseeability
test results in a different amount of recoverable damages in each?
Or should we examine whether foreseeability and remoteness issues
should be treated the same because the theory might be the same?
That cannot be answered without first determining whether the theory of tort liability should differ from that of contract obligation,
and then exploring whether the differing theories call for different
uses of foreseeability.
The theoretical distinction between contract and tort should be
based on the source and nature of the legal obligation. The obligation in tort is imposed generally and is intended to fairly control the
relations among people. Tort obligations are normative or average
standards of conduct. 0 6 The contract obligation, by contrast, is
voluntarily assumed. 107 The duty created may be highly individualized. It may also be unfair when measured by the normative standards of that model of socially conforming conduct, the reasonably
prudent person. 10 8 The regime of contract must be kept separate
from tort in order to provide machinery for the creation of nonconforming and unusual duties.' 0 9
Does a distinction between tort and contract based on the
ship would catch fire and damage wharf); Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Miller S.S. Co.
(Wagon Mound I), [1967] A.C. 617 (foreseeable that spilled oil would catch fire and damage
nearby ships, even though risk was slight); C. Czarnikow Ltd. v. Koufos (Heron II), [1969]
A.C. 350 (foreseeable that breach of contract to deliver sugar would result in lost profits
when sugar prices fell during delay); H. Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co.,
[1978] 1 All E.R. 525. In these cases, the barristers argued that the test of remoteness is the
same in both contract and tort. In the Heron 11 case, the House of Lords seemed to conclude
that the test of remoteness is different for the two fields, with the test for contract being
whether the loss was in the contemplation of the defendant at the time of contracting, and the
test for tort being whether the injury was foreseeable as the natural and probable result. In
Parsons, a later case, Lord Denning said:
I find it difficult to apply those principles universally to all cases of contract or to all
cases of tort, and to draw a distinction between what a man 'contemplates' and
what he 'foresees.' I soon begin to get out of my depth. I cannot swim in this sea of
semantic exercises-to say nothing of the different degrees of probability---especially when the cause of action can be laid either in contract or in tort. I am swept
under by the conflicting currents.
[1978] 1 All E.R. 525, 532.
106. See O.W. HOLMES, supra note 24, at 86-89.
107. For a detailed argument that contract must be founded on voluntariness, see Levin
and McDowell, supra note 33, at 28-43.
108. This is not to say that fairness is not an important aspect of the contractual obligation. For an explanation of the relationship between fairness and voluntariness of a contract
obligation, see id. at 31-33.
109. Most contractual relations are now so standardized in adhesion contract situations
that a standardized definition of obligation at first appears to work as well in contract as in
tort. There are two reasons for rejecting that proposition, however. The first is that important contractual arrangements are not standardized. The second is that the system ought to
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source of the obligation require distinctive concepts of foreseeability? The extent to which a contracting party intends to assume an
individualized and atypical obligation indicates the foreseeability
that breach of that duty will cause consequences differing from
breach of a standardized or conventional duty. The Hadley v. Baxendale distinction between general damages, or conventional foreseeability, and consequential damages, or particularized foreseeability, may not be essentially a contract distinction but rather, a
distinction between tort and contract. 110 If the routine standardized transaction, carrying standard obligations and giving rise to
standard damages which are imputedly foreseen, could be viewed as
more tortious than contractual in nature, then finding the foreseeability which is real and based on consent to an additional or atypical obligation and risk would identify this obligation as belonging to
the realm of contract.
A final theoretical problem is the lack of criteria to use in making choices about whether to categorize a case as contract or tort.
No theory, however complete, can totally avoid the borderline classifications problem, but the area of uncertainty should be kept to a
minimum. Consistent with the theoretical distinctions between the
two fields, the criteria for categorizing should relate to the primary
source and nature of the defendant's obligation. Because the source
of the obligation in borderline cases can often be traced to either
field, the courts should develop rules which allow weighing the voluntariness of a defendant's action against social policies and generalized expectations. If the voluntariness is the more important
ground of liability, the case should be analyzed under contract theory; if the infringement of generalized expectations is paramount,
the case should be categorized as tort.
There are problems inherent in collapsing the fields of contract
provide the parties in a routine situation with the power to individualize it by contracting out
of all or part of the standardized provisions.
110. Another problem must be faced in a serious reconsideration of contract and tort
theories. What issues traditionally analyzed as belonging to one field really belong to the
other? Two sub-areas normally classified as contract and thus controlled by contract rules
are quasi-contractual recovery and reliance recovery, particularly promissory estoppel. If
contract is defined as the voluntary assumption of an obligation, neither sub-area is genuinely
contractual. Rather, they are tort theories taught as contract partly due to historical developments and partly for pedagogical convenience. Foreseeability is important in reliance theory
in deciding whether there is an obligation at all. The defendant must have reasonably expected (foreseen) that his promise would induce reliance before there is any liability. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). Remoteness is not usually a problem
in reliance theory, since the plaintiff is limited to recovering reasonable reliance expenses.
"Reasonable" functions in this context as the remoteness controller.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:286

and tort simply because there is no clear theory or criteria for distinguishing between them. These problems are evident in the ongoing development of products liability jurisprudence, in which there
has been increasing movement away from fault concepts and toward reliance on strict liability theory.
IV.

STRICT LIABILITY AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY

Strict liability theory presents serious remoteness issues. Since
liability is not based on fault, there is no opportunity for choice,
which in fault-based liability makes foreseeability a defensible element in differentiating those injuries for which the defendant is responsible from those whose costs the victim must bear.
Strict liability theory has evolved from the early cases of keeping
dangerous animals or nonnatural substances likely to escape and
cause harm, III through cases involving blasting or dispensing inherently dangerous commodities l12 to modem products liability. 1 3
Thus, the products liability concept moved from situations amenable to the use of fault notions based on the defendant's choice to
engage in extraordinarily risky conduct to cases where the defendant's activity was increasingly common, socially useful, and sufficiently complex to make proof of real fault difficult, if not
impossible. Strict liability theory abandons the inquiry into
whether the defendant has violated a legal duty; instead, emphasis is
placed on compensating the injured plaintiff.
One formulation of products liability theory now widely used is
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.1 4 Nowhere in
111. E.g., May v. Burdett, 115 Eng. Rep. 1213 (1846) (plaintiff bitten by defendant's
monkey); Stamp v. Eighty-Sixth St. Amusement Co., 95 Misc. 599, 159 N.Y.S. 683 (App.
Term. 1916) (lion); Fletcher v. Rylands, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865) (release of water).
112. E.g., Coporale v. C.W. Blakeslee & Sons, 149 Conn. 79, 175 A.2d 561 (1961) (blasting); MacKenzie v. Fitchburg Paper Co., 351 Mass. 292, 218 N.E.2d 579 (1966) (dumping
inflammable ink in city dump).
113. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, §§ 75-81 & 95-104A.
114.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TorS § 402A (1965).
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this section or the comments is the concept of foreseeability discussed. This is appropriate, since the linking concepts of fault and
choice have been abandoned. Yet, although foreseeability has dis-

appeared from the theory of products liability, it is still manifest in
cases requiring a causal connection between the defective product
and the injury suffered by the plaintiff.'15 This connection is measured by the traditional tort standard of proximate cause and encompasses the notion of foreseeability. 116 If the use was not a
foreseeable one, either because the use was outside the anticipated
risks," 7 or because the consumer failed to read or follow the warn-

ings or instructions,"' the manufacturer will not be liable. The degree to which foreseeability has been used or can be used to limit

liability for remote consequences is much more limited than in
traditional fault analysis.
Products liability is not a system of legal liability based upon
wrongdoing, but a judicially imposed insurance scheme for the protection of injured consumers.' ' 9 The manufacturer or the dominant
115. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 102.

116. Id
117. See, eg., Schwartz v. American Honda Motor Co., 710 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1983)
(evidence supported claim that plaintiff misused vehicle he was riding when he lost control
and sustained severe bums; no definitive proof was offered that such misuse was reasonably
foreseeable by the defendant); Venezia v. Miller Brewing Co., 626 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1980)
(neither brewer nor manufacturer liable for injuries sustained by eight-year-old child who
threw a bottle against telephone pole, since such an act is clearly beyond the ordinary use
intended for product); American Optical Co. v. Weidenhamer, 457 N.E.2d 181 (Ind. 1983)
(force exerted on the right lens of a pair of safety glasses far exceeded what was reasonably
foreseeable and what the lens was designed for; manufacturer held not liable for lathe operator's injuries sustained when an object struck and shattered the lens).
118. See eg., Dugen v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 73 Ill. Dec. 320, 454 N.E.2d 64 (Il. App.
1983) (manufacturer and seller of a lawn mower not liable for injuries suffered by plaintiff
when mower picked up one ejected object which blinded plaintiff's right eye because the
operator ignored warning about mowing near bystanders); Levin v. Walter Kidde & Co., 51
Md. 500, 248 A.2d 151 (1968) (user of siphon bottle read instructions for bottle's use but
ignored them; court denied recovery for injuries from bottle because of failure to use reasonable care).
119. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41
(1944) ("The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the
manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment c (1965) ("On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability has been said to be... that public policy demands that the
burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon
those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be obtained."); Klemme, The EnterpriseLiability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L.
REV. 153, 227-28 (1976) ("The purpose of enterprise liability theory of tort is to permit
inevitable losses to be shifted to the economic beneficiaries of the enterprise which brought
them about.
...).
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person in the marketing chain becomes the administrator of an insurance plan; that party can most effectively spread the cost of defective or injurious products among all users. 120 The cost allocated
to each consumer for the projected losses will become a part of the
price. This scheme conceals a serious remoteness problem.
An example of the limitless liability which can be imposed appears in Ilasky v. Michelin Tire Corp.12 1 There, the plaintiff's father, after purchasing a used car with two Michelin radial tires on
the rear wheels, had the rear tires switched to the front and
purchased two conventional snow tires for the rear. 122 While driving the car, the plaintiff lost control, crashed into a utility pole, and
was severely injured. 123 Her theory of liability was that the mixing
of conventional and radial tires created a danger of oversteering,
and that the product was defective unless adequate warning was
given.12 4 Michelin had publicized the danger and warned every di125
rect purchaser but had not warned purchasers of used tires.
Plaintiff contended that the warning should have been affixed to the
tire. 126 The West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed a jury verdict of
$500,000. 127 Thus, for the price of two radial tires, and despite all
reasonable efforts to warn of the danger, Michelin (and its other
customers) must be prepared to pay a half-million-dollar verdict.
When an individual at risk purchases protection from a private
insurer, each party has options for limiting potential liability.' 2 8
The insured selects the amount of coverage he desires; should his
120. The statement in the text refers to insurance in its modem form, as a system of
transferring risks to an insurer who can spread them over a pool of people subject to that risk.
Insurance has been used in some cases in an older sense to mean that the "insurer" is absolutely liable without any fault and not subject to any qualifications or defenses. In some cases
and scholarly discussion there is the statement that it is firmly established that a manufacturer does not have the status of an insurer as respects the products in which he deals. Enterprise liability requires that the claimant establish that the product was defective, that
claimant's injury was caused by the defect, and that there was no assumption of the risk by
the claimant. When these defenses are not available, the manufacturer either must have liability insurance or use insurance techniques to collect the reserves out of which losses will be
paid.
121. 307 S.E.2d 603 (W. Va. 1983).
122. Id. at 607.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 608.
126. Id.
127. IcL at 614.
128. See R. KEETON, BASIC TExT ON INSURANCE LAW 329 (1971) (discussing the ability of insured or insurer to limit recovery to a dollar amount); see also W. YOUNG & E.
HOLMES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 141-236 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing insurer's ability to refuse to accept unusual risks).
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subsequent loss exceed the selected limits, he bears the excess. The
insurer also has substantial control over the extent of his liability.
For instance, the insurer can refuse to extend coverage if the perceived risk is too great. Alternatively, the insurer can agree to insure but only up to a certain dollar limit. Under governmental
insurance schemes such as Social Security, unemployment compensation, or workers' compensation, the legislature can fix limits by
setting eligibility requirements and maximum benefits. Failure to
set realistic limits, as may arguably have happened with cost of living clauses in entitlement programs, is correctable by subsequent
legislative action.
A comparison between governmentally imposed insurance and
products liability can be illuminating. Two classes are subject to the
substantial risk of injuries caused by modern industrial production:
employees injured by the productive machinery and consumers injured by defective products. Employees are protected by workers'
compensation acts which impose absolute liability on employers for
injuries arising out of the course of employment but limit compensation to specified amounts for various types of injuries.129 Consumers injured by defective products generally recover under the
strict liability theories within the Uniform Commercial Code's implied warranties130 or under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Unlike the workers' compensation statutes, the
implied warranty and strict liability in tort theories do not set maximum dollar limits on damage awards.
In 1913 Jeremiah Smith questioned whether the preferential
treatment under the newly enacted workmen's compensation acts
for injured workers whose damages were not caused by anyone's
fault could be justified when compared with the fate of bystanders
or of paying customers who were injured in the same accident but
could recover nothing. 13 1 Given the evolution of products liability
since that time, his question can be reversed. Can we justify the
privileged position granted to consumers who are injured without
fault when compared to the limited compensation of workers injured without fault in the course of producing consumer products?
Because products liability theory does not permit the parties to
set maximum liability limits, the only choice the manufacturer may
have is to go out of business. When the activities in question are not
129. 2 A. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 58.00-.40 (1983 & Supp.
1985).
130. U.C.C. §§ 2-314 & 2-315 (1978).
131. Smith, Sequel to Workman's CompensationActs, 27 HARv. L. REv. 235, 237 (1913).
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rare and dispensable enterprises around which strict liability arose,
but activities vital to our economic system, such as the pharmaceutical, chemical, building materials, and automobile industries which
are the subject of the bulk of product liability litigation, eliminating
the activity is no longer an acceptable choice to society. Yet, this is
the potential result of a liability system which ignores the issue of
remoteness.
The choice is also not the original one in tort of acting so carefully that there is no liability. Products liability losses under section
402A or the UCC implied warranties fall into three groups: (1)
those which are unavoidable despite'the strictest care, (2) those
which result from avoidable carelessness, and (3) those which arise
from intentional cost-benefit choice, where managers determine that
the total cost of compensating the losses caused by the product is
less than the cost of altering the product to prevent the losses. 132 A
manufacturer has little motive to identify which defective products
fall in the second group and then try to minimize or eliminate that
group when he does not have to pay the losses out of his 3 3 pocket.
The costs are passed on to the consumer.
The market also does not effectively control the cost of this insurance. It is an unpredictable, but fixed, cost. It is unpredictable
because it is subject to the irrational and uncontrollable process of
jury awards. If a competitor has fewer losses and thus a lower cost
of insurance, the producer in question must cut costs in other ways
because this is an unavoidable cost. 134 It appears, ironically, that

jury awards indicating that one producer is causing more injuries
than his competitor would force that producer to cut quality even
more in order to be price competitive.
132. One of the best known and most egregious examples of this was the memorandum
showing that Ford managers expressly decided not to make a six-dollar-per-car alteration on
the location of gas tanks in the Pinto automobile because it would cost more than paying a
few wrongful death judgments which they anticipated would come from this design defect.
See Ex-FordAide's Testimony CalledKey to Pinto Trial,N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1980, at A6, col.
5.
133. "His" and "manufacturer" are used here analytically, not descriptively. Most manufacturers are corporations, and actions taken are those of corporate managers. Their actions
may affect profits and thus impact on stockholders, or affect price, and thus impact on consumers. Normally, corporate managers do not pay the cost of their bad decisions. This has
eroded the element of personal responsibility which, along with the concepts of fault, choice,
and foreseeability, exerted an effective limitation on careless conduct.
134. As a possible consequence, the fortunate competitor with fewer products liability
losses might raise prices to meet those of the unfortunate producer, thus increasing profits.
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V.

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN RESPONSIBILITY
AND COMPENSATION

When traditional contract and tort theories were being formalized in the nineteenth century, liability of the defendant-actor and
compensation for the plaintiff-victim were essentially two sides of a
single coin. In every two-party litigation of the common law paradigm, it seemed obvious that a defendant who had violated a legal
duty should pay full compensation to any innocent party he had
injured. This necessary connection between the responsibility for
injury and the duty to compensate continues to be an unexamined
assumption of our civil law. 3 '
Certain conditions must exist for the connection to be defensible. The defendant must be the actor who was at fault in violating
the legal standard, the plaintiff must not be responsible for the loss,
and the defendant must not be able to shift the duty to pay the
judgment to someone else. Twentieth century social and legal developments raise serious doubts as to whether these conditions are
present in the bulk of current civil litigation.
The first of these developments is the movement away from
legal liability grounded on clear fault toward theories of liability
with only tenuous connections to blameworthy conduct. In cases of
intentional torts and willful breaches of contract, compelling the
perpetrator to compensate the victim for all injuries caused, regardless of cost, is both morally and socially defensible.' 3 6 Liability
based on negligence (carelessness) carries a lesser degree of fault
and consequently a less compelling obligation for the actor himself
to make full compensation.' 3 7 Where the legal system permits the
requisite carelessness to be established by inference, as in res ipsa
loquitor, or eliminates the necessity of establishing any wrongdoing,

as in products liability, the connection between violation of duty138
135. This assumption is also gaining acceptance in our criminal justice system, where
repeated demands have been made to incorporate restitution to the victim as part of the
criminal sanction. Since, however, most criminal acts that would give rise to a restitution
claim would permit a civil action for such recovery, such demands are redundant and evidence confusion between criminal and civil aims.
136. This idea is attributable to Aristotle, whose concept of corrective justice required the
wrongdoer to restore to the victim all losses caused by his wrongful act. Both Aristotle's
discussion and his illustrations indicate that the wrongdoing had to be intentional. See ARsTOTLE, NicHomAcHEAN ETHics, Bk. V, Ch. IV (T. Taylor trans. 1918).
137. This explains in part why liability insurance may always be purchased to indemnify
against negligence liability, but in many states it is against public policy to indemnify an
intentional tortfeasor. See, e-g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54
Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
138. As one gets closer on the continuum to no-fault liability, it seems incongruous to
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and obligation to pay full compensation becomes even less selfjustifying.
A second and related development is the rapid increase in the
use of liability insurance to transfer the duty to compensate from
the person who breached the legal duty to a professional risk
spreader, the insurance company. A property owner always has his
assets at risk because some of his actions might be careless and
cause injury. That risk is much greater now, given modem technology's increased potential for damage. Assuming the legal system
has a policy against making property interests highly uncertain because of the ever-present danger of civil liability, there is a dilemma
about how best to achieve that goal.
One approach dominant in the nineteenth century was to
tighten the scope of liability through the use of foreseeability and
139
such other remoteness controllers as the privity requirement.
Outside of these devices, some means of providing compensation
had to be found to prevent the bankrupting of responsible actors
whose wrongdoings were only some form of carelessness or misjudgment. Liability insurance has generally been the answer; of
course, the more widespread the use of liability insurance, the more
the legal system could relax tight controls on remoteness
recovery. 140
A third development is the increased degree to which the party
responsible for the injurious action is a corporate enterprise. If the
activity in question was within the realm of the corporation's business, the duty to compensate is on the corporation. 141 Choices,
however, are made by real, not artificial persons. It is often difficult
to identify which corporate agents are responsible for the harmful
decisions or injurious activity because corporate decisionmaking is
usually collective. Even if the person or persons responsible for the
wrongful act are identifiable, placing the duty to compensate on
those individuals may be very difficult if they were engaged in corspeak of violation of a legal duty. The necessity to make such a determination and speak in
such terms is an inheritance from our fault theories.
139. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
140. For the poor, this has not presented a problem; they are not likely defendants in civil
suits due to their inability to respond in money damages. Nevertheless, the poor are subject
to various forms of harrassment inflicted by creditors seeking to secure payment of debts. The
legal system has generally responded by restricting the more egregious collection tactics. A
well-known example is Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (consumer sales security agreement which took unfair advantage of the seller's bargaining power held unconscionable and thus unenforceable).
141. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 69.
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porate business.14 2 In the case of corporate action, there are strong
incentives to concentrate on the issue of compensation and avoid
the problem of personal responsibilty for obeying the law.
To the extent that the compensation duty is carried by an insurer or by a corporate enterprise, and the triggering condition for
that duty is conduct only tenuously connected with blameworthy
conduct by an identifiable person, there has been a damaging impact on the normative side of the civil law. From the perspective of
the defendant, a judgment for damages which must be paid out of
his assets is a fine for violating a legal norm. Once an actor can
purchase indemnity insurance and budget the premiums as a regular cost of living or of doing business, there is no personal cost exacted for acting carelessly. If the aim of the civil law is merely to
compensate the victims for injuries, the loss of normative effectiveness may not be serious, although the reduced incentive to act with
reasonable care might lead to increased total costs for
compensation.
VI.

FORESEEABILITY AND THEORY

An analysis of the concept of foreseeability in our civil law will
not be complete until a choice is made between fault-normative theories of law and compensatory, no-fault theories. That choice is
forced because foreseeability does and should operate differently
under each approach.
If the dominant purpose of contract and tort law is normative,
the content given to foreseeability must aid in answering the question of whether the defendant has violated a legal duty. How much
awareness of the potential harm is necessary before a rational and
decent person would choose to act in such a harm-avoiding manner
must also be determined. Within this theoretical framework, foreseeability has a justificatory role. It legitimates the condemnation
of the defendant as a lawbreaker and permits society to impose unpleasant consequences upon him. Much of the discussion in the
cases has carried this connotation,14 3 as would be expected in a sys142. If there is joint liability between the corporation and an employee, an injured plaintiff will usually seek to enforce the judgment against the corporation's "deep pocket." Moreover, the corporation will often have liability or indemnity policies protecting their employees
against personal liability while they are acting for the corporation.
143. In tort cases, more clearly even than in contract ones, foreseeability is the criteria
which is used to distinguish the permissible or acceptable kinds of conduct from those which
are violations of a legal duty and therefore condemned as wrongful or improper. Eg., J'Aire
Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979):
In each of the above cases, the court determined that defendants owed plaintiffs a
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tern which has traditionally regarded itself as fault-based.
If our civil law's dominant aim has become compensatory, intended to provide adequate monetary protection for the injured
party, foreseeability functions to identify the amount and sources of
the injured party's recovery. This role of foreseeability can be specified only in light of what compensatory schemes are available in the

legal-economic-social system.
Compensatory systems could be totally private. In theory, the
defendant could always be required to compensate the injured
plaintiff from his own resources. Alternatively, the defendant could
be allowed to transfer that responsibility to a private insurer by
purchasing liabilty insurance. Finally, the victim could have
purchased accident insurance prior to the harm.
Compensatory schemes could be totally governmental, as in a
complete welfare state; all persons in need, due to accident, fate,

natural processes, negligent activity, or intentional wrongdoing,
would receive necessary assistance from governmental programs. 144
duty of care by applying criteria set forth in Biakanja v. Irving. . . . Those criteria
are (1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, (2)
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury, (4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct
and the injury suffered, (5) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct
and (6) the policy of preventing future harm ....
Rather than traditional notions of duty, this court has focused on foreseeability
as the key componenet necessary to establish liability: "While the question whether
one owes a duty to another must be decided on a case-by-case basis, every case is
governed by the rule of general application that all persons are required to use ordinary care to prevent others from being injured as the result of their conduct ....
[F]oreseeability of the risk is a primary consideration in establishing the element of
duty."
Id. at 804-06, 598 P.2d at 63-64, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 410-11 (citations omitted); Markowitz v.
Arizona Parks Bd., 706 P.2d 364 (Ariz. 1985):
The first question presented, therefore, is whether the state as a possessor of land is
under any duty of care with respect to the safety of those it has invited to use the
particular parcel of state land. Arizona recognizes that a possessor of land "is
under an affirmative duty" to use reasonable care to make the premises safe for use
by invitees . . . . In the case of invitees, the law generally recognizes that this
standard of reasonable care includes an obligation to discover and correct or warn
of hazards which the possessor should reasonably foresee as endangering an invitee.
Id. at 367 (emphasis in original); Gruetzemacher v. Billings, 348 S.W.2d 952 (Mo. 1961):
In any event liability to an invitee does not result alone from (1) ownership or
occupancy, (2) invitation, express or implied, and (3) injury, because the owner or
occupant is not an insurer of the safety of even a business invitee ....
The basis
of his liability is his superior knowledge of an unreasonable risk of harm of which
the invitee, in the exercise of ordinary care, does not or should not know .
Id at 957 (citations omitted).
144. That such an approach is not impossible in our political system is evidenced by the
proposals for a negative income tax or a system of minimum family income which were
discussed with some seriousness during President Nixon's administration. See generally D.
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If government support is high enough, there would be little or no
need for a tort system or for private insurance.
The present system is a hybrid, relying largely on private insurance and personal judgments against defedants, but supported by a
floor of governmental programs."' If compensation is the goal, the
definition of foreseeability must relate to responsibility for guaranteeing compensation. A threshold issue is identifying those relationships in which the potential victim should insure through firstparty insurance and those situations in which the actor should carry
third-party liability insurance. Foreseeability is of little use in this
inquiry because, in most situations, foresighted victims will carry
accident or property insurance and foresighted actors will carry liability insurance. If our civil law system is truly compensatory, fault
is no longer a factor, and the responsibility for providing compensation coilld well be placed on the victim.146
If the responsibility to provide compensation rests with the victim and he has sufficient resources to purchase private insurance,
foreseeability has an important cutoff function, akin to traditional
remoteness analysis or to contributory negligence defenses. If the
victim should be aware of both the need to protect himself and of
the potential range of injury but elects to purchase no insurance or
to underinsure, he should accept the consequences of that choice.
There is no justification for transferring the result of this bad judgment onto the defendant, once traditional fault analysis is abandoned. Presumably, the imprudent victim would still be entitled to
the minimum protection of the governmental floor which society
provides for those who could not adequately insulate themselves.
If the duty is on the actor to carry third-party insurance, he
would probably fulfill this responsibility by carrying the types and
amounts of insurance a reasonable person in his shoes would foresee
as appropriate. This sounds very much like the Hadley v. Baxendale formulation. 147 The actor must provide insurance for conventional damages unless he could foresee special damages, in
which event he ought to insure against those special circumMOYNIHAN, THE POLmIcs OF A GUARANTEED INCOME: THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION
AND THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN (1973).

145. Among the governmental programs are: worker's compensation, Social Security,
unemployment insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, Aid to Families with Dependent Children,
and general welfare. Perhaps private charity, including family and neighborly assistance,
should be included in a complete listing of compensatory schemes.
146. The move to no-fault insurance in automobile injuries may well be a recognition of
the appropriateness and effectiveness of using first-party insurance in a compensatory scheme.
147. See supra note 3.
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stances.1 48 Thus, under a compensatory approach, tort and contract foreseeability are comparable. 14 9
It may be unnecessary to choose between a fault-normative view
of civil law and a compensatory, no-fault view. Increasingly, compensatory solutions are the dominant ones."50 Allowing the compensatory approach to occcupy the entire field could be described as
recognizing an existing reality. A natural consequence would be the
complete jettisoning of the fault-normative residue of nineteenth
century solutions. Perhaps normative questions should be left to
criminal law regulation, while the civil law should be concerned
solely with compensatory matters.
This proposition is problematic, however. Criminal law has historically dealt with severe violations of very important norms; it
addresses conduct more egregious than the violation of civil law

norms. The most common civil law violations are: (1) breaches of
contract which, while not willful or malicious, result from factors
which the breacher should have anticipated and guarded against,
and (2) careless conduct, fitting within the rubric of negligence,
which produces harm. The typical contract and tort breaches tend
to have the same quality of norm violation-conduct which is

neither intentional nor malicious but which falls below the level of
148. The proper consequences for failure to insure when to do so was a foreseeable duty
remain undetermined. One obvious consequence would be to require the actor to compensate
the victim out of his property to the extent to which he should have insured. Often, however,
the choice not to insure is made for reasons of economy and is likely to go hand-in-hand with
being judgment-proof. This necessitates mechanisms within first-party insurance, such as the
uninsured motorist provision in comprehensive automobile policies, to assure compensation
against insolvent defendants. This furthers the argument that compensatory schemes should
focus on first-party insurance purchased by prospective victims.
149. There is a practical, but not theoretical, difference. In contract, when the parties
specify individualized, rather than standardized relations, foreseeability is heightened.
Futhermore, contract provides the opportunity to allocate risks and the consequent responsibility to insure. The terms of a contract and the process of negotiation may make it easier in
contract than in tort to determine who accepted the responsibility of a risk and the duty to
compensate or provide insurance.
150. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 85, at 608-15; Klemme, supra note 119, at
153 ("For more than a hundred years the trend has been away from the concept of fault as a
basis for determining liability in the law of torts."); see also Manzanares v. Bell, 241 Kan.
589, 604, 522 P.2d 1291, 1304 (1974):
[AIll studies concluded that the risk of tort liability based upon negligence is not a
significant factor in inducing vehicle operators to drive more carefully; that the tort
system of reparations based upon fault is excessively expensive and inefficient as a
means of compensating automobile crash victims; that compensation distribution to
accident victims under the tort system is inequitable in that it commonly results in
overpayment for minor injuries, gross underpayment for those more seriously injured, and long delays in receipt of compensation.
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action in which a rational, prudent, foresighted person would
engage.
Can self-interest or nonlegal mechanisms such as the economic
market produce the desired level of careful conduct? Is it permissible to "buy" the right to act carelessly or imprudently by paying for
such action directly or through insurers, so long as that conduct is
not criminal? Foreseeability, when used normatively, defines the
area below acceptable conduct yet above criminal misconduct. Indifference to this area and acceptance of the compensatory aim as
the dominant role of the civil law relegates foreseeability to the limited function of defining the amount of recovery.
Even if the normative function is retained as an important aim
in the civil law, there is a final problem: determining the legal consequences which should attach to the breach of duty. The sanction
of full compensation is often dysfuctional; in some instances, it
would be too little, while, in severe injury cases, it could be much
too large. To achieve normative ends, it is important that a sanction be paid out of the wrongdoer's pocket and not be transferable
to an insurer. If, however, the severity of the civil sanction is measured by the magnitude of compensation, the anomaly may arise
where penalties for mild civil violations are more severe than those
statutorily mandated serious criminal violations. One possible solution could be to prohibit actors from transferring a specific portion
of the damages to their insurers. The amount need not be large in
most cases, since it is only intended to give bite to the normative
standard. It might operate analogously to the deductible in firstparty insurance. Thus, an insured who violated a civil legal duty
would have to pay a specified amount out of his pocket before the
insurer would be obligated to pay anything.
The content of foreseeability is controlled by theory, not so
much contract or tort theory, but rather fault or compensatory theory. Foreseeability has always had two different formulations and
two different functions. One formulation is the normative objective
of the civil law, relevant to the issues of responsibility and obligation, manifest in the duty element in tort and in formation of the
agreement in contract. The role of foreseeability at this level is justificatory. It seems improper to impose a tort duty on one who did
not or should not have had sufficient knowledge of the potential
harm to avoid it. It seems equally improper to say a party has voluntarily assumed a contractual duty for consequences he did not or
could not foresee.
Where the search for fault has been abandoned, as in implied
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contractual warranties and strict liability in tort, administrative difficulties of proving fault are probably responsible. Nevertheless, to
say that it is administratively inconvenient to search for fault is different from holding that fault is unimportant. For instance, the law
does not condone deliberate breach of an oral contract within the
Statute of Frauds; instead, legal enforcement is denied because the
administrative difficulties and potential for overreaching are so
great. 5' 1 This distinction is of critical importance. Responsibility
to conform to legal norms is always central to the civil law, even
though we make a secondary judgment in certain areas of conduct
that it is not practicable to pursue inquiry into that obligation.
Foreseeability in the compensation context is a very different
formulation. There, foreseeability functions to identify upon whom
the compensation duty falls and to set the level of compensation.
This formulation is related to the concept of remoteness and is generally tied to the issues of damages in contract and causation in tort.
As long as responsibility and compensation issues were seen as interlocking, so that the wrongdoer had the responsibility to compensate, the two conceptions of foreseeability could easily be fused or
confused. Where this connection has been broken, as in those areas
where fault is not a relevant issue, only the question of compensation remains. Removing the moral content of foreseeability leaves
pure compensation theory at a loss to address the difficult issues of
our time-the remoteness question in no-fault liability and the
problems of normative responsibility in civil law.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Legal liability which must be paid for by an individual defendant out of his personal assets has historically been based on fault
concepts. 152 Fault implies choice which in turn implies foreseeability. As the theories of contract and tort evolve from their currently
confused states, each ought to retain the traditional notions of personal responsibility, fault and choice. The advantage of fault theory
is that it reinforces those two fundamental prescriptive statements:
People should not injure each other if they can avoid it, and
promises ought to be kept. This prescriptive quality of law makes
relevant the foreseeability approach which defines whether a legal
obligation exists.
The problems of remoteness of consequences and limitation on
151. See E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 6.1, at 370-73.
152. See supra notes 32-45 and accompanying text.
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the amount of damages for which a civil defendant should be responsible present issues separate from the prescriptive aspect,
although the distinction is not generally perceived. The foreseeability concept which makes logical and ethical sense in ascribing obligation has been used as a device to solve remoteness issues. 153 The
dubiousness of that usage has led many commentators to see foreseeability as a54mask or rationalization for cutoff lines drawn on pol1
icy grounds.
In the areas where fault search has been abandoned and strict
liability imposed, specific focus on the compensatory objective,
utilizing the narrower formulation of foreseeability is justifiable.
Foreseeability has utility in identifying which party ought to have
the responsibility of arranging for compensation and what levels of
compensation would satisfy that duty. 55 Responsibility can be satisfied by obtaining liability insurance of the type and amount which
a reasonable person could foresee as sufficient.' 5 6 Should the responsible individual elect to underinsure, he should have to bear the
consequences of that decision.
Thus, two concepts of foreseeability with different purposes are
at work in our civil law. Foreseeability in traditional fault-based
liability should carry with it some form of sanction. It is this sanction which preserves the normative role of the law. Because costs
can be covered by insurance, the mere duty to make full compensation is often dysfunctional within the normative aim. One solution
is to say that some portion of the actor's responsibility cannot be
transferred to an insurer, operating much like a deductible in an
insurance policy.
This analysis leaves open the serious problem of remoteness in
products liability cases. Neither conception of foreseeability can be
used to deal with that problem. Products liability is not a regime of
civil liability, but rather a legally imposed insurance scheme.15 7
The issue of appropriate types and levels of compensation involves
matters of social justice, public policy, and welfare economics and is
thus beyond the competence and techniques of courts. It is an urgent matter for legislatures and one which has not yet been appropriately addressed.
153. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 51-65 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 111-33 and accompanying text.

